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Zobrest v. CatalinaFoothillsSchool District:
A Victory for Disabled Children, A Snub
for the Lemon Test
It is not at all easy . ..to apply this Court's various decisions
construing the [Establishment] Clause to governmental
programs of financial assistance to sectarian schools and the
parents of children attending those schools. Indeed, in many of
these decisions we have expressly or implicitly acknowledged
that "we can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in
this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Many had hoped that Zobrest v. CatalinaFoothillsSchool District'
would be the case in which the Supreme Court clarified its framework
for evaluating the permissibility of government aid to religious institutions under the Establishment Clause.' Instead, the Court only added
to existing confusion by ignoring, though not discarding, the infamous
three-prong Lemon test.4 Nevertheless, the Zobrest Court did take the
opportunity to bolster the rights of disabled children.
The Supreme Court has evaluated under the Establishment Clause
many state programs that either directly or indirectly grant aid to children attending sectarian schools.' Yet before Zobrest, the Court had
never examined the constitutionality of state aid granted to sectarian
schools under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
("IDEA").6 Scholars had predicted that a conflict between the IDEA
1. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 393 (1983) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 612 (1971)).
2. 113 S.Ct. 2462 (1993).
3. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L.REV. 795,
860 (1993) (stating that Zobrest would be an excellent case for the Court to begin to
"clear away the underbrush of two decades of adverse precedents growing out of Lemon").
The Establishment Clause requires that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion .... U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. I.
4. The test was introduced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See infra
notes 47-60 and accompanying text for discussion of the Lemon test.
5. See cases cited infra note 61.
6. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-85 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). See Thomas F. Guernsey & M.
Grey Sweeney, The Church, the State, and the EHA: Educating the Handicappedin Light
of the Establishment Clause, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 259, 261 (1989) (observing that the
Court had not yet considered the constitutionality of state aid to disabled children in sectarian schools under the IDEA's predecessor).
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and the Establishment Clause would arise when parents chose to enroll
children who qualify for IDEA assistance in sectarian schools.7 These
predictions became a reality in Zobrest, in which the Supreme Court
held that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit a school district
receiving funding under the IDEA from providing a sign-language
interpreter to a deaf student enrolled in a sectarian school.8
This Note critically analyzes the Zobrest decision and explores the
Court's current approach to evaluating government aid to sectarian
schools under the Establishment Clause. First, the Note discusses the
requirements of the IDEA and the possibilities for conflict between the
IDEA and the Establishment Clause. 9 Next, the Note examines the
evolution of the Court's framework for evaluating Establishment
Clause issues.'° It then reviews the majority and dissenting opinions
in Zobrest." Next, the Note analyzes the Zobrest decision in light of
the policies reflected in the IDEA and the Court's increasing dissatisfaction with the present framework for evaluating Establishment
Clause challenges. 2 The Note then proposes an approach for deciding
Establishment Clause questions. 3 Finally, this Note predicts that the
Court will refine the framework under which it evaluates
Establishment
Clause issues and continue to broadly interpret the
14
IDEA.

In 1970, Congress passed the Education of the Handicapped Act ("EHA"). Pub. L. No.
91-230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970). Congress amended the EHA in 1975 with the Education for
All Handicapped Children Act ("EAHCA"). Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975). In
1990, Congress amended the EAHCA, renaming it the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act ("IDEA"). Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (eff. Oct. 30, 1990)
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-85 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). The IDEA
employs the term "children with disabilities instead of handicapped children," the term
used in the EHA and the EAHCA. Id. This Note will use the term the "IDEA" unless the
sources cited specifically refer to the "EHA" or the "EAHCA." For a discussion of the
IDEA's purpose and provisions, see infra part II.A-B.
7. Guernsey & Sweeney, supra note 6, at 260-61. Guernsey and Sweeney predicted
that the Court would eventually encounter a conflict between the EHA and the
Establishment Clause; however, at the time the authors made this comment, they
believed that the constitutionality of EHA on-site programs was doubtful. Id. at 261.
Contrary to what the authors expected, the Zobrest Court deemed constitutional the onsite placement of a governmental employee under the IDEA. See infra part III.B.
8. 113 S.Ct. at 2469.
9. See infra part II.A-B.
10. See infra part II.C-E.
11. See infra part III.
12. See infra part IV.A-B.
13. See infra part IV.C.
14. See infra part V.
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II.BACKGROUND
A. The IDEA: EducationalRights for Disabled Children
The IDEA provides state and local agencies with federal assistance
for the education of disabled children, conditioned upon a state's
compliance with federal goals and procedures." To receive IDEA
funding, a state must show that it "has in effect a policy that assures all
children with disabilities the right to a free appropriate public education."' 6 A "free appropriate public education" ("FAPE") 7 includes
special education' 8 and related services' 9 specially designed to meet the
15. 20 U.S.C § 1412 (Supp. IV 1992). See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
179 (1982).
16. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (Supp. IV 1992). The IDEA defines "children with disabilities" as children "(i) with mental retardation, hearing impairments including deafness,
speech or language impairments, visual impairments including blindness, serious emotional disturbance, orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health
impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and (ii) who, by reason thereof, need
special education and related services." Id. § 1401(a)(1)(A).
The terms used in this definition are in turn defined in the Code of Federal Regulations.
For example, "deafness" is defined as "a hearing impairment that is so severe that the
child is impaired in processing linguistic information through hearing, with or without
amplification, that adversely affects a child's educational performance." 34 C.F.R. §
300.7 (1993).
17. The IDEA defines "free appropriate public education" as follows:
[Sipecial education and related services that(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge,
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency,
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school
education in the State involved, and
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program
required under section 1414(a)(5) of this title.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1988).
The IDEA requires states providing special education and related services to
"mainstream" disabled children by establishing "procedures to assure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including children in public or
private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with children who are not
disabled." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (Supp. IV 1992). See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305
(1988).
18. The IDEA defines "special education" as "specially designed instruction, at no
cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability,
including-(A) instruction conducted in the classroom, in the home, in hospitals and
institutions, and in other settings; and (B) instruction in physical education." 20
U.S.C. § 1401(16) (Supp. IV 1992).
19. The IDEA specifies that "related services" consist of the following:
[T]ransportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive
services (including speech pathology and audiology, psychological services,
physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic recreation, social work services, counseling services, including rehabilitation
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unique needs of a disabled child. 20 Once a child qualifies for a FAPE,
local school district representatives, teachers, the child's parents or
guardian, and, where appropriate, the child, meet to formulate an
Individualized Educational Program ("IEP"). 2' The public school
system must provide the child with an education that comports with the
child's LEP; 22 if it does not, the school system thereby fails to provide
a FAPE as a matter of law.23
Although the IDEA itself defines a FAPE, 24 the Court has found it
necessary to examine congressional intent in order to determine the

counseling, and medical services, except that such medical services shall be
for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist a
child with a disability to benefit from special education, [including] the early
identification and assessment of disabling conditions in children.
Id. § 1401(17).
20. Id. § 1401(16). The purpose of the IDEA is "to assure that all children with disabilities have available to them ...a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs." Id. §
1400(c).
2 1. The IDEA defines. "individualized education program" as follows:
[A] written statement for each child with a disability developed in any meeting
•.. which statement shall include-

(A) a statement of the present levels of educational performance of such child,
(B) a statement of annual goals, including short-term instructional
objectives,
(C) a statement of the specific educational services to be provided to such
child, and the extent to which such child will be able to participate in regular
educational programs,
(D) a statement of the needed transition services for students beginning no
later than age 16 and annually thereafter (and, when determined appropriate for
the individual, beginning at age 14 or younger), including, when appropriate,
a statement of the interagency reponsibilities [sic] or linkages (or both)
before the student leaves the school setting,
(E) the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration of such services,
and
(F) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for
determining, on at least an annual basis, whether instructional objectives are
being achieved.
Id. § 1401(20) (Supp. IV 1992) (footnote omitted); see 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.343-.346
(1993).
22. 34 C.F.R. § 300.341; see supra note 21.
23. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203 (1982) (holding that in
order to meet the requirement of providing a FAPE to a disabled child, a state must
provide personalized instruction and support services that "comport with the child's
IEP"). See Michael F. Tomasek, Comment, Let's Get off the Floor: The Callfor Illinois
to Adopt a Higher Substantive Standard for Special Education, 24 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 375,
385 (1993).
24. See supra note 17.
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precise meaning of FAPE.2" In Board of Education v. Rowley,2 6 the
Court formulated a two-prong test for evaluating whether a school
system has provided a child with a FAPE.27 First, a court must look
to whether the state has complied with IDEA procedures.28 Second, it
must look to whether the child's IEP was "reasonably calculated to
enable the child to receive educational benefits., 29 By meeting both
requirements, states comply with their IDEA obligations, and courts
cannot require them to do more.'
B. IDEA-Required Services Provided in PrivateSchools
The services required by the IDEA need not be provided in a public
school setting. In certain circumstances, the IDEA permits children to
attend a private school and still receive special education and related
services from the state. 3' The IDEA provides that when a public
educational facility cannot provide a child with needed Services, the
state may, at no cost to the parents or guardian, place the child in a
private facility that will provide the services.32 Still, the IDEA does

25. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188.
26. 458 U.S. 176 (1982). Rowley represents the Court's first interpretation of a
provision of the EAHCA. Id. at 187. At the time of Rowley, the IDEA was still known
as the EAHCA.
27. Id. at 206-07.
28. Id. at 206.
29. Id. at 207.
30. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207. Rowley concerned a partially deaf child, Amy Rowley,
who was an excellent lip reader. Id. at 184. Amy's IEP required that she be placed in a
regular public school first-grade classroom providing her with a hearing aid and the
instruction of a tutor and a speech therapist. Id. Amy's parents believed that Amy also
needed a sign-language interpreter in her classes. Id. After observing Amy in class with
an interpreter for a two-week trial, however, the school determined that she did not need
the interpreter's services. Id. at 185. Nevertheless, Amy's parents decided to pursue
their request through proceedings specified by the IDEA. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185.
On review, the Court disagreed with a district court's finding that although Amy was
performing well, she was denied a FAPE unless she was afforded an opportunity to meet
her full potential. Id. at 185-86. The Court stressed that Congress designed the IDEA
more to "open the door of public education to [disabled] children" than "to guarantee any
particular level of education once inside." Id. at 192. It ruled that Amy's IEP met both
requirements of the two-prong test because she was receiving "personalized instruction
and related services" calculated by the school to meet her educational needs. Id. at 210.
Accordingly, the Court determined that the IDEA did not require the state to provide a
sign-language interpreter for Amy. Id. The Court reasoned that Amy was receiving an
"adequate" education because she was performing at an above-average level and advancing easily from grade to grade. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 209-10.
3 1. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1992).
32. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4)(B) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 34 C.F.R. § 300.401
(1993).
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not give states the power to place children in sectarian schools.33 Such
placement by parents, however, is specifically allowed for under
federal regulations.34
Nonetheless, if parents choose to enroll their child in a sectarian
private school, the state is not required to pay in full for the child's
education.35 The state need only provide the special education and
related services appropriate to the child's IEP.36 This combination of
state aid under the IDEA and the parents' placement of a disabled child
in a private sectarian school triggers Establishment Clause issues.37
C. The Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment dictates that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion. 38 The Supreme Court first applied the clause to the issue of
state aid to sectarian schools in Everson v. Board of Education.39 In
Everson, the Court held that to satisfy the Establishment Clause, a
state must act neutrally toward both the nonreligious and the religious. 4° Specifically, the Everson Court ruled that a state could reim33. 34 C.F.R. § 300.348; see 34 C.F.R. §§ 76.532, 300.400-.401, 300.341
(prohibiting use of funds for religious instruction); see also Guernsey & Sweeney, supra
note 6, at 260 & n.8 (citing Matter of Jennifer M., 1986-87 EHLR Decisions 508:259
(SEA Wash. 1986), in which the state authority concluded that the placement of a
disabled child in a sectarian school pursuant to the IDEA violated the Establishment
Clause and federal regulations).
34. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.403, 300.341 (allowing parents to place their disabled
children in private religious or nonreligious schools and requiring states to make appropriate special educational services available to those childien).
35. Id. § 300.403(a) (1993).
36. Id. §§ 300.403(a), 300.341(b)(2), 300.451-.452 (1993). The Supreme Court has
not yet addressed whether the IDEA requires states. to provide special education and
services to disabled children on-site at private schools chosen by parents. See Allan G.
Osborne, Jr., Providing Special Education and Related Services to Parochial School
Students in the Wake of Zobrest, 87 Educ. L. Rep. 329 (West) (Feb. 10, 1994). Several
lower federal courts have held that the IDEA does not require a school district to provide
these services on-site when the school district has offered a FAPE in the local public
schools. See, e.g., Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., 930 F.2d 363, 369 (4th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 188 (1991); Tribble v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ.,
798 F. Supp. 668 (M.D. Ala. 1992); see also infra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
37. Guernsey & Sweeney, supra note 6, at 260-61.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. I, ci. 1.
39. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The First Amendment applies to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 8 (citing Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1943)).
40. Id. at 18. In Everson, the Court declared that the Establishment Clause "requires
the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and nonbelievers; it does not require the state to be their adversary." Id. Before arriving at this
conclusion, the Court examined the origins of the Establishment Clause in order to
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burse parents of both public and sectarian schoolchildren for the
expense of bus transportation to and from school. 1 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court emphasized that the state did not direct funds to
the schools themselves.42 The Court opined that because the program
instead distributed funds directly to parents without regard to religion
and in order to transport children, the program was neutral and thus
constitutional. a3
During the next twenty-four years, the Court followed the Everson
neutrality test and further refined its application of the Establishment
Clause as applied to both school-aid and other cases. 44 In school-aid
cases decided during those years, the Court shifted its focus from
whether states may provide benefits to sectarian schools to how those
benefits may be provided.45 Then, in 1971, the Court announced an
approach to Establishment Clause analysis that became the model for
school-aid cases and influenced Establishment Clause analysis in
discern the Framers' original purpose. It focused on the early settlers' flight from
Europe to escape from religious persecution and government-established churches. Id. at
8-9. The Court recognized the writings of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson as indications of the original purpose of the First Amendment because both men played leading
roles in the amendment's adoption. Everson, 330 U.S. at 13. The Everson Court then
cited the famous words commonly attributed to Jefferson: that the Establishment Clause
was "intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and State."' Id. at 16
(quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)). For a discussion of the
"wall of separation," its origins, and its use in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, see
Stephen J. Safranek, Can Science Guide Legal Argumentation? The Role Of Metaphor In
Constitutional Cases, 25 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 357, 371-99 (1994).
41. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16-17.
42. Id. at 18.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (holding that property tax
exemptions for religious organizations are constitutional); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236 (1968) (holding that a state could provide textbooks to private school
students); see Raymond W. Mitchell, Comment, A Small Departure from the Truth:
When Private Religious Speech Runs Afoul of the Establishment Clause, 23 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 867, 872 (1992).
45. Guernsey & Sweeney, supra note 6, at 269. In Everson, the Court indicated that it
could not prohibit the state from providing general state law benefits to all citizens
without regard to religion. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16. Thus, with Everson the Court
acknowledged the need for states to provide benefits in public, private, or sectarian
schools through statutes like the IDEA. However, the Court continued to examine the
process by which benefits are provided to determine if the Establishment Clause had
been violated. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397, 399 (1983) (reasoning that the
availability of tax deductions to all parents without direct financial assistance to
schools is an important factor 'in finding a program constitutional under the
Establishment Clause); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975) (emphasizing that
direct assistance to sectarian schools "inescapably results in the direct and substantial
advancement of religious activity, and thus constitutes an impermissible establishment
of religion") (citation and footnote omitted); Guernsey & Sweeney, supra note 6, at 269;
infra note 61.
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general. 46 In Lemon v. Kurtzman,47 the Court set forth a three-prong
test for evaluating governmental programs that touch sectarian
schools.4 8 Under Lemon, a program is valid if it possesses the
following characteristics: (1) it has a clear secular purpose; (2) it has a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it
does not generate an "excessive government entanglement with
religion." 49
Lemon concerned two state statutes. The first, a Rhode Island
statute, authorized the state to supplement the salaries of nonpublic
school teachers who taught secular subjects by directly paying teachers
up to fifteen percent of their annual salaries. 50 The second, a
Pennsylvania statute, reimbursed nonpublic schools for teachers'
salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials that related to secular
subjects taught in public schools.5
In evaluating these statutes, the Lemon Court mentioned Everson in
recognizing the difficulties presented by Establishment Clause questions, but did not rely on the Everson test. 52 Instead, the Court
46. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601-02 (1989) (holding
that a courthouse display of a creche failed the effect prong of the Lemon test and thus
violated the Establishment Clause by conveying a message of government endorsement
of religion); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987) (holding that exempting religious
organizations from Title VII's prohibition of religious discrimination in employment
does not violate the Establishment Clause under the Lemon test); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 59-60 (1985) (holding that a state statute authorizing a daily period of silence
in public schools for meditation or voluntary prayer failed the purpose prong of the
Lemon test and thus violated the Establishment Clause because the statute's sole purpose
was to endorse prayer activities at the beginning of each school day).
See infra note 61 for a summary of the Court's rulings on the constitutionality of state
aid that touches sectarian schools.
47. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
48. Id. at 612-13.
49. Id. The Lemon Court cited Allen, 392 U.S. at 243, for the secular purpose prong
and the neutral effect prong, and Walz, 397 U.S. at 674, for the excessive entanglement
prong. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-15.
In Allen, the Court deferred to the state's legislative intent to improve the quality of
secular education. Allen, 392 U.S. at 243. The Court determined that secular and sectarian teachings were not so intertwined that the state's provision of secular textbooks
furthered the teaching of religion. Id. at 248.
In Walz, the Court upheld a state statute that gave tax exemptions to religious organizations for real property that the organizations owned and used for religious services.
Walz, 397 U.S. at 680. The Court required close scrutiny of the entanglement between
the state and religious organizations to determine the amount of intrusion of each on the
other. Id. at 674-75.
50. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607-08.
51. Id. at 609-10.
52. Id. at 611-12. The only other time the Court mentioned Everson was in its analy-
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employed its newly formulated test to strike down both statutes,53
concluding that they violated the third prong of the test by excessively
entangling state government and religion. 4 The Court reasoned that
the Rhode Island statute created a danger that the teachers whose
salaries were supplemented would not be able to separate secular and
religious subjects during class sessions.55 It concluded that to alleviate
this danger, the state would have to continuously monitor teacher
performance, which in turn would necessitate an excessive and
impermissible entanglement of state and religion. 6
The Court found that the Pennsylvania statute created the same
danger, plus one more.i It stressed that the Pennsylvania statute
provided financial aid directly to the sectarian school rather than to
students and parents, 51 which would allow the state to inspect school
financial records to determine whether aid was spent for religious or
secular purposes. 59 This, the Court reasoned, created too "intimate" a
relationship between church and state. 6°
Since Lemon was decided, the Court has applied its three-prong test
to deliver a variety of rulings on the constitutionality of state support
touching sectarian schools. 6' Two recent cases have focused on three
sis of the Pennsylvania statute. Id. at 621. The Court noted that the Pennsylvania
statute provided state aid directly to the sectarian school, in contrast to the Everson
statute, which provided aid to the student and his parents. Id.
53. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607.
54. Id. at 615. The Court set forth detailed criteria for determining if a statute creates
excessive entanglement. Id. The criteria included "the character and purposes of the
institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the
resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority." Id.
55. Id. at 617.
56. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619. The Court added that teachers, unlike books, would
require continuous inspections, rather than just one inspection, to determine the extent
of entanglement. Id.; see also Allen, 392 U.S. at 238 (upholding a state program that
provided sectarian school students with secular textbooks).
57. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620-21.
58. Id. at 621.
59. Id. at 621-22.
60. Id.
61. Several broad propositions have arisen from these decisions: Government
programs do not automatically violate the Establishment Clause because sectarian
schools indirectly benefit. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Witters v.
Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463
U.S. 388 (1983); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756 (1973); see also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). Yet direct aid subsidizing
typical costs of a sectarian school does violate the Establishment Clause. Grand Rapids
Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Levitt
v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973). Programs that
supply aid to students and parents rather than directly to a sectarian school may also be
unconstitutional. Ball, 473 U.S. at 395; see also Witters, 474 U.S. at 487; Wolman,
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factors in assessing the constitutional propriety of state-aid programs
under the effect prong: (1) whether the program neutrally benefits a
broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion; (2)
whether it directly or indirectly subsidizes sectarian schools; and (3)
whether any benefits received by sectarian schools under the program
are triggered by a private choice.62 In both cases, the Court applied the
Lemon test; however, it examined the effect prong more closely than
the other two prongs.63
Mueller v. Allen' involved a challenge to a Minnesota statute that
permitted all parents to deduct from their state income tax certain
educational expenses of their children.65 The Court found the statute
constitutional under the three-prong Lemon test.66 As for the first
prong-whether the statute had a clear secular purpose-the Court
deemed acceptable the state's purpose of defraying the cost of education in both secular and sectarian schools.67 Turning to the second
prong-whether the primary effect of the statute neither advanced nor
inhibited religion-the Court concluded that the statute withstood
scrutiny because the deductions were available to all parents, not just
those with children in sectarian schools. 68 The Court also noted that
rather than providing financial assistance directly to the schools them433 U.S. at 250. Finally, the Court has ruled that a state program that places a public
employee in a sectarian school or that provides teachers to sectarian schools violates
the Establishment Clause. See Wolman, 433 U.S. at 243-44, 247-48; see also Aguilar
v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 410 (1985); Ball, 473 U.S. at 385; Meek, 421 U.S. at 371;
Mitchell, supra note 44, at 873 n.32. Zobrest, however, may indicate a retreat from this
view. See infra part V.B.
62. See Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2466 (referring to Mueller and Witters as examples
where the Court has "consistently held that government programs that neutrally provide
benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion are not readily
subject to an Establishment Clause challenge just because sectarian institutions may
also receive an attenuated financial benefit").
63. See Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Is Lemon a Lemon? Crosscurrents in Contemporary
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence,22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 129, 151 (1990) ("While putatively adhering to the Lemon test, the Court instead has emphasized state neutrality
towards religion by expanding the test's 'effects prong."') (footnote omitted).
64. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
65. Id. at 397.
66. Id. at 404.
67. Id. at 395.
68. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396-97. Although the petitioners in Mueller argued that the
statute primarily benefited those parents whose children attended sectarian schools, the
Court did not consider this alleged consequence in detail. Id. at 400-01.
The Court noted that the effect prong presented a more difficult question than the
purpose prong, primarily, "whether the Minnesota statute has the 'primary effect of
advancing the sectarian aims of the nonpublic schools."' Id. at 396 (quoting Committee
for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980)). The Court did not elaborate on why it
had greater difficulty addressing the effect prong. Id.
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selves, the statute made funds available to the schools only as a result
of parents' choices to send their children to sectarian schools.6 9
Finally, addressing the third prong, the Court concluded that the
statute did not create an excessive entanglement between the state and
religion.70 It reasoned that the only government surveillance required
by the statute was determining whether textbooks claimed as
deductible were truly secular in nature. 7'
Three years later, in Witters v. Washington Departmentof Services
for the Blind,72 the Court examined the constitutionality of a state
vocational rehabilitation program, under which a blind person could
have received financial assistance to study at a private Christian college
in preparation for a career as a pastor or missionary.7 a The Court
again invoked the Lemon test.74 Applying the first prong, the Court
acknowledged the program's secular purpose of promoting the vocational rehabilitation of disabled persons. 75 Turning to the second
prong, the Court concluded that the program's primary effect was not
the advancement of religion because the program provided funds
directly to students rather than to sectarian schools.76 The Court also
noted that the program made funds available without reference to
whether the student attended a secular or sectarian institution; thus, it
offered no financial incentive to attend one school or another.77 The
Court held that the program did not violate the Establishment Clause
based on this analysis of the first and second prongs of the Lemon
test.7 8 The Court specifically left open the opportunity for the
Washington Supreme Court to analyze the program under the entanglement prong of the Lemon test on remand.79
69. Id. at 399.
70. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 403.
71. Id.
72. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
73. Id. at 483-85.
74. Id. at 485.
75. Id. at 485-86.
76. Witters, 474 U.S. at 486-88. The Court observed that "[vocational assistance
provided under the Washington program is paid directly to the student, who transmits it
to the educational institution of his or her choice." Id. at 487. The Court also noted that
the second prong required a much more challenging analysis than the first. Id. at 486.
The Court did not state a reason for this difference, but did state that its analysis under
the first prong was straightforward. Id. at 485.
77. Witters, 474 U.S. at 487-88.
78. Id. at 489.
79. Id. at 489 n.5. Because the Washington Supreme Court had not addressed the
entanglement prong of the Lemon test, the Court declined to address that issue, leaving
open the possibility of the state court considering it on remand. Id. The Court reasoned
that it would be inappropriate to discuss the entanglement issue without the "benefit" of

456

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 25

In determining whether the statutes at issue in Mueller and Witters
had the primary effect of advancing religion, the Court noted that both
provided funds to sectarian schools only as a consequence of parents
deciding to send their children to such schools.80 Thus, state officials
played no role in the decision that caused the funds to be directed to the
schools. 8' The Witters Court specifically posited that a student's
choice to use neutrally available government funds to help pay for
religious education does not "confer any message of state endorsement
of religion" and thus does not violate the Establishment Clause.82 This
principle of favorably viewing state aid delivered as a consequence of a
private choice has greatly influenced the Court in subsequent cases. 83
Governments usually exceed the limits of the Establishment Clause,
however, when they directly subsidize the general operating costs of a
84 for
sectarian school. A statute struck down in Meek v. Pittenger,
example, provided "massive aid" to private schools by directly loaning
them teaching materials and equipment.85 Applying the Lemon test,
the Court accepted as secular the state's legislative purpose of advancing educational opportunities.86 The Court ruled, however, that the
statute violated the second Lemon prong-whether its primary effect
advanced religion-because more than seventy-five percent of the
schools that benefited were sectarian. 7 The Court reasoned that the
aid was "neither indirect or incidental," but was instead a "direct" and
"substantial" subsidy to sectarian schools.88 Furthermore, the Court
maintained that the character of the equipment loaned-maps, charts,
and laboratory equipment-made it difficult to separate secular and
sectarian use of the equipment.89
a decision by the court below. Id. The Court deferred to the state supreme court's conclusion that "analysis could be more fruitfully conducted on a more complete record."
Witters, 474 U.S. at 489 n.5.
80. Id. at 488; Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399.
8 1. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 488; Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399.
82. Witters, 474 U.S. at 489. Similarly, the Mueller Court noted that "a program like
[the Minnesota statute] that neutrally provides state assistance to a broad spectrum of
citizens is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause." Mueller,
463 U.S. at 398-99.
83. See, e.g., Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2468-69; see also infra text accompanying notes
153-54 and part IV.B-C.
84. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
85. Meek, 421 U.S. at 354-55, 365.
86. Id. at 363.
87. Id. at 363-64.
88. Id. at 365-66.
89. Id. at 365. The Court did not address the entanglement prong of the Lemon test
when invalidating the equipment provision of the statute since it had already found a
violation of the primary effect prong of the test. Meek, 421 U.S. at 363 n. 13.
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The Meek Court also invalidated state funding for sectarian school
counselors and teachers of remedial and exceptional students because
of the danger that religious and secular subjects might be intertwined.'
The Court emphasized that its prior decisions made clear that a state
cannot assume that teachers in sectarian schools will succeed in keeping their religious beliefs separate from their secular educational
responsibilities. 9 The Court determined that government surveillance
would be needed to control the use of state-provided funds and that the
resulting political and administrative entanglement would violate the
Establishment Clause.92
D. Lemon and the Endorsement Test
In recent years, the Court has modified the primary effect prong of
the Lemon test, referring to it as the "endorsement" prong. 93 Justice
O'Connor suggested this change in her concurring opinion in Lynch v.
Donnelly.94 She proposed that when applying the effect prong, a court
should inquire whether "the practice under review in fact conveys a
message of endorsement or disapproval." 95
The Court began to embrace the endorsement concept in School
District of Grand Rapids v. Ball,96 ruling that providing public
employees to teach classes in private sectarian schools violated the
90. Id. at 370.
91. Id. at 370 n.20. The Court recognized that its prior decisions make clear that
courts cannot rely entirely on "the good faith and professionalism of the secular teachers
and counselors functioning in church-related schools to ensure that a strictly nonideological posture is maintained." Id. at 369 (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 618-619; Public
Funds for Pub. Sch. v. Marburger, 358 F. Supp. 29, 40-41 (D.N.J. 1973), aff'd, 417 U.S.
961 (1974)). In Lemon, the Court concluded that state surveillance would "inevitably be
required" to determine whether teachers separated religious issues from secular subjects.
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619. The Court reasoned that the potential for teachers to promote
religion in secular classes is great, and that the state must make certain that this does not
happen. Id. at 618-19. Necessary surveillance, the Court concluded, would require
"excessive and enduring entanglement between state and church." Id. at 619.
In Marburger,the district court reaffirmed the Supreme Court's determination in Lemon
that excessive entanglement would be required in order for the state to be certain that
personnel do not advance religion in their secular duties. 358 F. Supp. at 40-41.
92. Meek, 421 U.S. at 372.
93. See Mitchell, supra note 44, at 874.
94. 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,concurring).
95. Id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In formulating this test, Justice O'Connor
noted that the meaning of a statement depends not only on the intent of the speaker but
also on the objective content of the statement. Id. Justice O'Connor later refined the
endorsement test to ask whether a "reasonable observer is likely to draw from the facts
...an inference that the State itself is endorsing a religious practice or belief." Witters,
474 U.S. at 493 (O'Connor, J.,concurring).
96. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
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Establishment Clause.97 The Court concluded that the two programs
in Ball violated the second prong of the Lemon test by having the primary effect of advancing religion.98 Specifically, the Court found that
the programs violated this prong in three ways. 99 First, state-paid
teachers in a sectarian school may have the opportunity to include
religious beliefs in their classes at the expense of the state.1° Second,
by providing secular instruction in sectarian school buildings, the
programs unavoidably created a "symbolic union of church and state,"
thereby sending a message to both students and the public that the state
supports religious activity.1 ' Finally, the programs directly subsidized the sectarian schools by assuming part of their responsibility for
teaching the secular subjects covered in the program.' 2
The Court explicitly adopted the endorsement concept as a means of
determining whether a governmental action advances religion in
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union., a case not
involving school aid. 10 3 In the Allegheny Court's view, Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch offered a "sound analytical framework" for Establishment Clause issues."° Specifically, the Allegheny
Court ruled that a courthouse display of a creche violated the
Establishment Clause, whereas the display of a menorah next to a
Christmas tree did not. 05
The Court examined the settings surrounding each display to
determine if the displays conveyed a message of government endorsement. 0 6 The Court reasoned that the items surrounding the crechean angel saying "Glory to God in the Highest!" and a sign disclosing
the ownership of the creche by a Roman Catholic organizationdemonstrated that the government was endorsing a religious
message. 0 7 As for the menorah, the Court maintained that because it
stood next to a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty, the government's message was to recognize the winter-holiday season, which
has attained secular status.'0 8
97. Id. at 389-92, 397.
98. Id. at 397.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Ball, 473 U.S. at 397.
102. Id.
103. 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989).
104. Id. at 595.
105. Id. at 621.
106. Id. at 598.
107. Id. at 598-600.
108. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 614, 616.
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Although the Allegheny Court treated the endorsement concept as a
modification of the Lemon effect prong, it did not examine the purpose
and entanglement prongs of the Lemon test.'0 9 The Court did not
address these prongs because the court of appeals had not considered
them." Thus, the essential three-part structure of the Lemon test was
not disturbed by Allegheny.
E. A Retreatfrom the Lemon Test?
The Court's decisions over the past twenty years have somewhat
eroded the original Lemon test and have created uncertainty regarding
the test's viability. This occurred as the Court effectively collapsed the
three-prong test into a two-prong test. Under the secular purpose
prong, the Court has rarely found a statute unconstitutional."'
Instead, the Court tends to defer to the legislature and accept its pronounced secular purpose." 2 Thus, the secular purpose prong has
proved to be an unimportant part of the analysis.' 3 In lieu of in-depth
examination of the secular purpose prong, the Court has focused much
of its attention on the Lemon effect prong." 4 For example, in Mueller
and Witters, the Court identified specific factors it sought in order to
satisfy the effect prong and thus hold the statutes at issue constitutional. "'
109. Id. at 594 n.45.
110. Id.
111. Meek, Mueller, and Witters all demonstrate a succinct discussion by the Court of
the secular purpose prong and ultimate acceptance of the state's purpose. See Witters,
474 U.S. at 485-86; Mueller, 463 U.S. at 395; Meek, 421 U.S. at 363.
112. Guernsey & Sweeney, supra note 6, at 271 n.90. See, e.g., Ball, 473 U.S. at
383 ("As has often been true in school aid cases, there is no dispute as to the first test.");
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 773 ("We do not question the propriety, and fully secular contents,
of New York's interest .... ").
Language in Lemon itself suggests the deference the Court chooses to give to the
legislature:
[T]he statutes themselves clearly state that they are intended to enhance the
quality of the secular education in all schools covered by the compulsory
attendance laws. There is no reason to believe the legislatures meant anything
else. A State always has a legitimate concern for maintaining minimum
standards in all schools it allows to operate.... [The State] must therefore be
accorded appropriate deference.
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. But see Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59-60 (1985)
(holding that a state statute authorizing a daily period of silence in public schools for
meditation or voluntary prayer violated the purpose prong because its sole purpose was
to endorse prayer at the beginning of each school day).
113. Guernsey & Sweeney, supra note 6, at 271 n.90.
114. See supra notes 62-63, 76-77, 93-110 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. In Ball and Allegheny, the Court
embraced Justice O'Connor's modification of the effect prong, referring to it as the
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Furthermore, the Court has called the validity of the Lemon test into
question by refraining from applying it. On several occasions prior to
Zobrest, the Court resolved Establishment Clause issues without
employing the Lemon test at all. In Marsh v. Chambers,"6 the Court
held that providing state legislative chaplains and opening legislative
sessions with a prayer did not violate the Establishment Clause." 7
Although a lower court had found an Establishment Clause violation
under the Lemon test, 1 8 the Court neither applied nor mentioned the
test in reversing." 9 Instead, the Court surveyed the 200 years of
history surrounding the practice of opening congressional sessions
with prayer.'20 Because the practice began when the First Congress
drafted the First Amendment, the Court reasoned, the drafters must not
have believed that opening sessions with prayer transgressed the
Establishment Clause.' 2 ' Accordingly, the Court concluded that the
practices of 22the state legislature at issue did not offend the
Constitution.1
1 23
The Court avoided the Lemon test again in Lee v. Weisman,
while holding that including a clergy member's prayer in a public
school graduation violated the Establishment Clause. 24 Although
specifically stating that it would not reconsider Lemon,2 5 the Court
' 26
relied on "settled rules pertaining to prayer exercises for students' ,
instead of the Lemon test. The Court reasoned that state involvement
in school prayers created a coercive pressure on students, who have
little choice but to participate in graduation ceremonies. 127 To allow a
religious exercise at a public school graduation ceremony, the Court
noted, would suggest that a public
school could compel a student to
128
participate in such an exercise.
"endorsement" prong. See supra part II.D.
116. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
117. Id. at 792-95.
118. Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 234-35 (8th Cir. 1982).
119. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795.
120. Id. at 786, 791-92.
121. Id. at 790-91.
122. Id. at 795.
123. 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992) ("We can decide the case without reconsidering
the general constitutional framework by which public schools' efforts to accommodate
religion are measured.").
124. Id. at 2661.
125. Id. at 2655.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2656.
128. Lee, 112 S.Ct. at 2661. Lee provided the foundation for the coercion standard
now favored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy. See
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Although Marsh and Lee demonstrate that the Court has departed
from automatic application of the Lemon test, the Court has recently
urged that "Lemon, however frightening it might be to some, has not
been overruled."' 2 9 The Court may not have overruled the Lemon test,
but as the Court's comment and its decisions in Marsh and Lee
suggest, the Court does recognize the limits of the test and
30 seems
hesitant to apply it to all Establishment Clause controversies. 1
III. DISCUSSION

A. Zobrest: The Factsand the Opinions Below
In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,'3' a deaf child,
James Zobrest, and his parents sued'3 2 a local school district that
refused to provide James with a sign-language interpreter while he
attended a Roman Catholic high school. 33 The Zobrests contended
that the IDEA and its Arizona counterpart required the school district to
provide the interpreter and that the Establishment Clause did not
prevent the district from doing so.' For the three years prior to high
school, James had attended a public school, during which time the
district provided him with an interpreter. 35 When James enrolled in a
private sectarian high school, the district discontinued the

infra notes 214, 217, 219 and accompanying text for a discussion of the coercion
standard.
129. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141,
2148 n.7 (1993).
130. Many members of the Court have directly criticized the Lemon test. See, e.g.,
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655-56 (Kennedy, J.,concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) ("Substantial revision of our Establishment Clause doctrine may be
in order ....");Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 426-30 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the entanglement prong of the test); see infra notes 214-16 and
accompanying text.
131. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
132. The IDEA grants the district courts jurisdiction over disputes arising from
parents' dissatisfaction with the services provided to their disabled child. 20 U.S.C. §
1415(e)(4)(A) (1988). The IDEA provides parents and guardians with a two-level administrative hearing process before a state agency; however, parents have the right to sue in
state or federal court when they are aggrieved by the state agency's decision. Id. §
1415(b)-(c), (e)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 204-206 (1982) (holding that these reviewing courts have the authority to make
"independent decision[s] based on a preponderance of the evidence"); Tomasek, supra
note 23, at 385-86. In Zobrest, the parties stipulated that pursuing administrative remedies would be futile. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464 n.2.
133. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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interpreter. 36
31 7
The trial court granted the school district summary judgment,'
concluding that state funding of a sign-language interpreter in a sectarian school would be an impermissible "entanglement of church and
state."' The court reasoned that the interpreter would be a "conduit"
for religious messages and would promote the student's "religious
development at government expense," thereby violating the
Establishment Clause.'3 9 The Ninth Circuit affirmed.' 4° Applying the
Lemon test,' 4' it held that a district-provided interpreter would create a
"symbolic union of government and religion" prohibited by School
District of Grand Rapids v. Ball. 42 The court stated that placing a
public employee in a sectarian school creates "the appearance that [the
government is] a 'joint sponsor' of the school's activities.' 43
B. The Opinion of the United States Supreme Court
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court held that the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment does not prevent a
public school district from providing a sign-language interpreter to a
deaf child attending a sectarian school.
Before reaching the
Establishment Clause issue, the Court addressed the rule of United
States v. Locke, 45 which requires courts to resolve questions on nonconstitutional rather than constitutional grounds wherever possible."46
The Court concluded that this rule did not apply because the parties
136. Id. Before refusing to provide an interpreter for James, the school district
received advice from both the County Attorney and the Arizona Attorney General that
the provision of an interpreter would violate the United States Constitution. Id.
137. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., No. 88-516 (D. Ariz. Oct. 19, 1989)
(order granting summary judgment).
138. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464.
139. Id.
140. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 1992).
141. Id. at 1193 (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613).
142. Id. at 1194. See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Ball.
143. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1194-95.
144. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2469. Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion was
joined by Justices White, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id.
145. 471 U.S. 84 (1985).
146. Id. at 92. In Locke, the Court recognized that an "entire case" on appeal
includes both nonconstitutional and constitutional questions and concluded that the
nonconstitutional questions should be addressed first. Id. The Zobrest Court recognized
this principle in stating that "federal courts will not pass on the constitutionality of an
Act of Congress if a construction of the Act is fairly possible by which the constitutional question can be avoided." Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2465 (citing Locke, 471 U.S. at
92).
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had raised only First Amendment issues below. 47 The Court thereby
avoided deciding whether the IDEA itself authorized the sign-language
interpreter and,48 accordingly, devoted its opinion to the Establishment
Clause issue.1
Although the Ninth Circuit had applied the Lemon test to evaluate
the Establishment Clause issue, 149 Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion never mentioned the test. The Court, focused instead on the
characteristics shared by the IDEA and the educational assistance
programs upheld in Mueller and Witters.150 The Court reaffirmed the
principles underlying those decisions, 5 ' concluding that aid under the
IDEA constitutes part of a broad government program that distributes
benefits "neutrally" to children who qualify as disabled.'52
The Court identified several aspects of the IDEA that paralleled
those found to support the programs approved in Mueller and Witters.
It stressed that the IDEA allows a parent, not the state, to choose a
child's school. 53 Furthermore, the Court noted that the IDEA offers
no financial incentive for parents to select a sectarian school over a
public one because children receive the same benefits either way. ,54
The Court also emphasized that James Zobrest's sectarian high school
55
would benefit only incidentally from IDEA support directed to him. 1
The Court noted with approval that no funds traceable to the government would be directly received by James's high school under the
IDEA. 5 6 In this respect, the Court opined, the IDEA presented even
147. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2466. Because the parties had only raised First
Amendment issues in the Ninth Circuit, the Court addressed only constitutional issues.
Id. The Court reasoned that although there may have been nonconstitutional grounds for
a decision "buried" in the record of the case, that was not enough to invoke the Locke
rule. Id. (citing Board of Airport Comm'rs. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 572
(1987)). The Court stated that "[w]here issues are neither raised before nor considered by
the Court of Appeals, this Court will not ordinarily consider them." Id. (quoting Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 147 n.2 (1970)).
In dissent, Justice Blackmun disagreed with the majority's analysis, arguing that
purportedly insufficient briefing of statutory and regulatory issues by the parties did not
justify the Court's examination of the constitutional claim. Id. at 2471 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (citing Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231 (1976); Escambia County v.
McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51-52 (1984); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 463 U.S.
147, 157-58 (1983)); see infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
148. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2466.
149. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
150. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2466-67.
151. See supra notes 64-83 and accompanying text.
152. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2467.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2468-69.
156. Id. at 2467-68.
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less of a constitutional problem than the programs upheld in Mueller
and Witters.'57
The Court then distinguished Zobrest from Meek' 8 and Ball,5 9 two
cases relied on by the school district as well as by Justice Blackmun in
his dissent.' 6° The Court identified two major differences between the
IDEA and the government programs challenged in Meek and Ball.'6'
First, the IDEA would not relieve James Zobrest's high school of an
expense it otherwise would have borne, as had the direct grants to
sectarian schools in Meek and Ball.'62 The Court again emphasized
that the high school would benefit only incidentally from an interpreter
provided for James under the IDEA. 6 3
Second, the Court determined that the role of a state-provided signlanguage interpreter differs from that of the teachers and guidance
counselors involved in Meek and Ball.'64 The Court reasoned that the
interpreter James Zobrest sought would "do [nothing] more than accurately interpret" any material presented in his classes, and thus would
neither enhance nor diminish the sectarian environment of the
school.' 65 Stressing that the Establishment Clause creates "no absolute
bar to the placing of a public employee in a sectarian school," the
Court ruled that providing a state-funded sign language interpreter to
James Zobrest at his sectarian high school was permissible under the
Constitution. 66
C. The Dissenting Opinions
In separate dissenting opinions, both Justice Blackmun 167 and
Justice O'Connor16 criticized the majority's failure to resolve the
statutory and regulatory issues presented in Zobrest before addressing
the constitutional issue. 169 The Justices reasoned that addressing the
157. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2467-68.
158.

421 U.S. 349 (1975). See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.

159. 473 U.S. 373 (1985). See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
160. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2468-69, 2473 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
161.

Id. at 2468-69.

162. Id.
163. Id. at 2469.
164. Id.
165. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2469.

166. Id. at 2469 & n.10 (citing Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 244 (1977)).
167. Justice Souter joined in Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion. Justices
Stevens and O'Connor joined in Part I of the dissent. Id. at 2469 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
168. Justice Stevens joined in Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion. Id. at 2475
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).

169. Id. at 2469 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 2475 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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nonconstitutional issues may have made a resolution of the
Establishment Clause question unnecessary. 70 Accordingly, they
concluded, the case should have been disposed of on nonconstitutional
grounds pursuant to the Locke principle. 7 '
Notwithstanding this contention, in his dissent Justice Blackmun
went on to address the Establishment Clause issue. 172 He criticized the
majority for authorizing for the first time a public employee's direct
involvement in religious education. 173 He observed that in the Catholic
school attended by James Zobrest, secular education and sectarian
beliefs were "inextricably intertwined."'' 74 Justice Blackmun
concluded that in such a school, a state-provided sign-language interpreter would be required to communicate religious material, secular
170. Zobrest, 113 S.Ct. at 2475 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Both justices acknowledged that "[i]t
is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint... that this Court will not reach
constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them." Id. (O'Connor,
J.,dissenting) (quoting Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold
Eng'g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984)); see id. at 2470 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting).
171. Zobrest, 113 S.Ct. at 2470 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting), 2475 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Justice Blackmun maintained that the case could be vacated and remanded
for consideration of two statutory and regulatory issues argued by the respondent school
district. Id. at 2470 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting). The first issue was whether the IDEA
requires a school district to provide a sign-language interpreter at any private school
when the necessary special education services are available at a public school. Id.
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-85 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Justice
Blackmun noted that several courts have ruled that the IDEA does not require this.
Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2470 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting Goodall v. Stafford
County Sch. Bd., 930 F.2d 363 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 188 (1991);
McNair v. Oak Hills Local Sch. Dist., 872 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1989)).
The second issue discussed by Justice Blackmun was whether the regulations promulgated under the IDEA prohibit providing a sign-language interpreter in a sectarian
school. Id. at 2470 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting 34 C.F.R. § 76.532(a)(1)
(1992), which prohibits the use of government money to fund religious activities). But
see 34 C.F.R. § 300.403(a) (1993) (requiring that states make educational services
available to disabled children placed in private schools by their parents).
Justice Blackmun criticized the majority for justifying its decision with the fact that
the parties had not properly briefed the nonconstitutional issues. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at
2471 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He stated that the Court has previously taken the route
of remanding cases "for consideration of statutory issues not presented to or considered
by [a] lower court." Id. (Blackmun, J.,dissenting) (citing Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S.
231 (1976); Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48 (1984)).
172. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2471 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting). Justice O'Connor
limited her dissent to the Locke issue; unlike Justice Blackmun, she did not address the
merits of the Establishment Clause issue. See id. at 2475 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 2471 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 2472 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Case Appendix at 92). Justice
Blackmun highlighted the Salpointe High School's Faculty Employment Agreement,
which stated that religious programs "are not separate from the academic and extracurricular programs, but are instead interwoven with them and each is believed to promote the
other." Id. at 2472 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Case Appendix at 90-91).
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material from a religious perspective, and daily Masses that the school
encouraged students to attend.'
Justice Blackmun further urged that a specific application of a
general program that distributes benefits neutrally may violate the
Establishment Clause. 7 6 Relying on past decisions, he noted that a
general program that grants assistance to disadvantaged students in
both secular and sectarian schools would violate the Establishment
Clause if the program provided teachers to schools.' 7 7 Such a
program, he emphasized, would still be invalid even if the teachers
were provided directly to students and parents rather than to sectarian
schools. 7 8 Thus, Justice Blackmun concluded, the constitutionality of
the IDEA-sponsored aid challenged in Zobrest depended on the presence of any dispositive difference between a teacher and a signlanguage interpreter. 179
Justice Blackmun first recognized that the Court has "always
proscribed" government benefits that provide "the opportunity for the
transmission of sectarian views."' ° He added that past decisions
make it clear that the government may not provide a "medium for
communication of a religious message."'' Justice Blackmun maintained that a sign-language interpreter in a sectarian school would be a
"conduit" for religious messages, and that providing an interpreter,
unlike merely providing funds, fosters intimate, daily government
participation. 82 This participation, he contended, creates an appearance that the government is supporting particular religious
175. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2472 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 2473 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Court has made a similar point
before. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618-622 (1988) (holding that on its face
the Adolescent Family Life Act did not violate the Establishment Clause, but remanding
for a determination whether particular applications of the statute had the primary effect
of advancing religion).
177. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2473 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Aguilar v.
Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 410 (1985); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385
(1985); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 371 (1975)).
178. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for
the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250 (1977)).
179. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
180. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Wolman, 433 U.S. at 244).
181. Id. at 2474 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun relied on the Court's
decision in Wolman, which prohibited government provision of instructional equipment such as slide projectors and tape recorders that could be used to convey religious
messages. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2474 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Wolman, 433
U.S. at 249). He also relied on Meek, which prohibited government provision of teachers and counselors in sectarian schools for fear they would further religious views. Id.
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Meek, 421 U.S. at 371).
182. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2474 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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influences. 8 3 In conclusion, Justice Blackmun expressed concern that
the Court had strayed
from nearly fifty years of Establishment Clause
18 4
jurisprudence.
IV. ANALYSIS
Although it arguably side-stepped Locke,' 85 the Zobrest Court
reached a sound result in light of the intent of Congress to "open the
door" to education for disabled children. 86 At the same time, by once
again ignoring Lemon, the Court compounded the confusion
surrounding the dubious three-prong test. These aspects of the
Zobrest decision are examined below, followed by a proposal of a
more flexible alternative to the Lemon test.
A. The IDEA Supports the Zobrest Result
As noted above, Locke requires that whenever possible, courts
resolve cases on nonconstitutional grounds before considering constitutional questions. 87 Nonetheless, the Zobrest Court brushed this rule
aside to reach the Establishment Clause issue and did not specifically
decide whether the IDEA required the state to provide services on-site
in a sectarian school chosen by parents.'88 Had the Court inquired into
the requirements of the IDEA, a reading of the regulations promulgated
thereunder would have suggested that the state was obligated to
provide a sign-language interpreter for James Zobrest.189 In sum,
183. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 2475 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
185. See id. at 2469-71 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
186. See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982); see also supra note
30.
187. See supra notes 145-48, 167-71 and accompanying text.
188. See Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2466; supra note 36.
189. Federal regulations require public agencies to make special education and related
services available to children placed in private schools by their parents. 34 C.F.R. §
300.403 (1993). Under the heading "Children with Disabilities Enrolled by Their
Parents in Private Schools," the Code of Federal Regulations provides in part:
The [state educational agency] shall ensure that(a) To the extent consistent with their number and location in the State,
provision is made for the participation of private school children with disabilities in the program assisted or carried out under this part by providing them
with special education and related services ....
34 C.F.R. § 300.451(a) (1993). This provision relies on the authority of 20 U.S.C. §
1413(a)(4)(A) (Supp. IV 1992).
Furthermore, IDEA regulations require public agencies to meet the requirements of
Education Department General Administrative Regulations ("EDGAR"). See 34 C.F.R. §
300.451(b) (1993) (incorporating EDGAR regulations at 34 C.F.R. §§ 76.651-.662).
EDGAR regulations provide that "[tihe program benefits that a subgrantee [state]
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though the Court reached a result suggested by IDEA requirements, by
avoiding Locke the Court neglected an opportunity to affirmatively
comment on the powers and funding the IDEA provides to state and
local agencies.
In addition to comporting with regulatory provisions, the Zobrest
result supports the policy behind the IDEA. The Court's own
language demonstrates its desire to not unnecessarily sacrifice the
needs of disabled children under the Establishment Clause: "If a child
chooses to enroll in a sectarian school, we hold that the Establishment
Clause does not prevent the school district from furnishing him with'9a
sign-language interpreter there in order to facilitate his education."1 0
The Court's decision is supported by the purpose behind the IDEA and
the IDEA's aim to make disabled children the primary beneficiaries of

provides for students enrolled in private schools must be comparable in quality, scope,
and opportunity for participation to the program benefits that the subgrantee provides
for students enrolled in public schools." 34 C.F.R. § 76.654 (1993). In addition,
EDGAR regulations provide that "[a] subgrantee [state] may use program funds to make
public personnel available in other than public facilities-(a) To the extent necessary to
provide equitable program benefits designed for students enrolled in a private school;
and (b) If those benefits are not normally provided by the private school." 34 C.F.R. §
76.659 (1993). These regulations suggest that at least some IDEA services must be
provided on-site at sectarian schools. See Dixie S. Huefner and Steven F. Huefner,
Publicly Financed Interpreter Services for Parochial School Student with IDEA-B
Disabilities, 21 J.L. & EDUC. 223, 230-31 (1992); see also Joseph R. McKinney,
Special Education and the Establishment Clause in the Wake of Zobrest: Back to the
Future,85 Educ. L. Rep. 587 (West) (Dec. 2, 1993).
Still, federal regulations prohibit the use of federal funds to pay for "[freligious
worship, instruction, or proselytization." 34 C:F.R. § 76.532 (1993). The Zobrest
Court accepted the United States' interpretation in its amicus curiae brief that 34 C.F.R.
§ 76.532(a)(1) "merely implements the Secretary of Education's understanding of (and
thus is coextensive with) the requirements of the Establishment Clause." Zobrest, 113
S. Ct. at 2465 n.7 (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23; Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae in Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind,
O.T.1985, No. 84-1070, p. 21, n.l 1). The Court also commented that the decision in
Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., 930 F.2d 363, 369 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 188 (1991) that the regulation prohibits provision of a sign-language
interpreter to a sectarian school student was reached without the benefit of the United
States' views. Id. See supra notes 36, 171. Thus, the Court seems to say that 34 C.F.R.
§ 76.532 does not bar the provision of at least some IDEA services in sectarian schools.
For additional discussion of IDEA requirements, see supra part IL.A-B.
190. Zobresi, 113 S.Ct. at 2469 (emphasis added).
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the statute.'19 Given both the importance of education' 92 and the great
needs of disabled children,' 93 the Zobrest ruling properly incorporates
public policy.
B. Another Snub for the Lemon Test
The Lemon Court specifically fashioned its test to evaluate government programs that touch sectarian schools. 194 It would seem that
because James Zobrest participated in such a program,' 95 the Court
should have directly applied the Lemon test to his case. Yet the Court
looked to other decisions, which had elaborated upon the three prongs
set forth in Lemon, as specific benchmarks for deciding Zobrest.'96 In
so doing, the Court suggested reliance upon critical factors, not
particularly stressed in Lemon, that have informed post-Lemon
Establishment Clause cases addressing state aid to sectarian schools:
Programs that are made neutrally available to students and parents
without reference to religion, and that benefit sectarian schools only
incidentally, indirectly, and as a consequence of private choices,
generally satisfy constitutional standards.
In lieu of a rote application of the Lemon test, the Zobrest Court had
available for comparative analysis two pairs of cases representing two
distinct lines of thought in sectarian school aid controversies. The
Court's selection of cases to apply reflected a belief that private choice
19 1. Id. The Court specifically recognized that "[h]andicapped children, not sectarian schools, are the primary beneficiaries of the IDEA." Id. In addition, the Court determined that "the function of the IDEA is hardly 'to provide desired financial support for
nonpublic, sectarian institutions."' Id. (quoting Witters, 474 U.S. at 48&). See 20
U.S.C. § 1400 (c) (Supp. IV 1992) (stating that the IDEA's purpose is "to assure that all
children with disabilities have available to them . . . a free appropriate public
education").
192. As one commentator expressed:
Education has been viewed by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of
Education as perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Therefore, the importance of the right to an education has often tipped
the balance between states and individuals in favor of individual rights.
Cynthia Pearson Purvis, Comment, The Eleventh Amendment Controversy Continues:
The Availability and Scope of Relief Against State Entities Under the Education of the
Handicapped Act, 22 IND. L. REV. 707, 729 (1989) (citation omitted).
193. According to congressional findings preceding the IDEA, "it is in the national
interest that the Federal Government assist State and local efforts to provide programs to
meet the educational needs of children with disabilities in order to assure equal protection of the law." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(9) (Supp. IV 1992).
194. See supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of how IDEA
funding touches sectarian schools through parents' decisions to place their children in
such schools.
196. See supra notes 149-66 and accompanying text.
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is a critical aspect of school aid propriety. First, the Court could have
followed the decisions of Meek' 9 and Ball,'98 each of which struck
down statutes that provided teachers and teaching equipment in sectarian schools. 99 By analogizing a sign-language interpreter to the
teachers in Ball or the communication instruments in Meek, the Court
might have readily concluded that providing a sign-language interpreter
in a sectarian school violates the Establishment Clause." °
2 0°
Instead, the Court chose to follow another pair of cases, Mueller
and Witters.2° Those decisions upheld general programs that touched
sectarian schools, yet did so neutrally and only as a consequence of
students' and parents' private choices.203 The Zobrest Court invoked
this causal aspect of Mueller and Witters in stressing the Zobrests'
personal decision to enroll their child in a Catholic school. 20 4 The
Zobrest Court also placed great weight on whether government funds
will support only students or instead may be diverted to support a
school's religious purposes.20 5 The Court noted with approval that
only an individual deaf child would have directly benefited had a signlanguage interpreter been provided to James Zobrest under the
IDEA.2 °6
C. A More Flexible Alternative
Zobrest highlights the Court's struggle to settle on an effective
approach for analyzing state aid to schools under the Establishment
Clause. 20 7 The characteristics of the instrument of state aid at issue in
Zobrest, a sign-language interpreter, illustrate the limitations of the
Court's current framework: A sign-language interpreter is not a
teacher, and thus does not control the content of the messages directed
to schoolchildren.2 8 Instead, an interpreter conveys messages
generated by others, much like a mechanical communication device.
197. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
198. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
199. See id. at 386-87; Meek, 421 U.S. at 370.
200. See Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2473-74 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting).
201. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
202. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
203. Id. at 487-89; Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399.
204. Zobrest, 113 S.Ct. at 2467-68.
205. Id. at 2469 & nn.10-11.
206. ld. at 2469; see supra text accompanying notes 155-56.
207. See infra notes 214-16, 248-49 and accompanying text for discussion further
illustrating the difficulties the Court has encountered.
208. See Ball, 473 U.S. at 388 (discussing how "a teacher may knowingly or unwillingly tailor the content of the course to fit the school's announced goals").
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Yet interpreters are individuals capable of self-generated expression,
unlike tape recorders or film-strip projectors. 2°9 In sum, the program
at issue in Zobrest defied ready analysis because it shared attributes
with statutes the Court has deemed both constitutional and
unconstitutional.21°
Although the Court has not overruled Lemon,2 ' Zobrest is only one
of several Establishment Clause decisions in recent years to ignore the
Lemon test. 212 As in earlier cases, the Zobrest Court had options other

than avoiding the test that would have alleviated the uncertainty
surrounding school-aid cases: the Court could have applied, revised,
or rejected Lemon. Instead, the Court passed on an opportunity to
clarify the test's much-questioned status. In response to the Court's
inaction, both the need to reexamine Lemon and a better alternative to
the Lemon test are explored below.
The limits of the Lemon test and the inconsistency with which it has
been applied are substantial. 1 3 Since the early years of the test, the
Court and its individual members have recognized its limitations and
questioned its value.2t 4 Indeed, in Lemon itself, the Court conceded
209. See Wolman, 433 U.S. at 247 (discussing how a therapist might have
opportunities to transmit religious views).
210. For example, the provision of a sign-language interpreter to a disabled child in
a sectarian school is the result of the private decision of parents to place the child in a
sectarian school, as with the statute upheld in Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for
the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986). See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text. On the
other hand, a sign-language interpreter is a government employee who would be
involved in a child's sectarian environment, as with the statute struck down in Aguilar v.
Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), which provided special education services for deprived
children taught by public school teachers in sectarian school classrooms. Id. at 406.
21 1. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141,
2148 n.7 (1993) ("Lemon, however frightening to some, has not been overruled.").
212. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783 (1983); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982); supra notes 116-28 and
accompanying text.
213. Compare Meek, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (holding that public employees entering a
sectarian school to provide auxiliary services violates the Establishment Clause) with
Wolman, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (concluding that providing auxiliary services by public
employees to sectarian students outside the sectarian school does not violate the
Establishment Clause). The Lemon test has been greatly criticized by legal scholars for
the confusion it has produced. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 44, at 874 & n.34 ("[T]he
most compelling criticism of the three-part test is the fact that it has failed to generate
any clear or consistent First Amendment jurisprudence." (quoting DONALD L. DRAKEMAN,
CHURCH-STATE CONSTrrUTIONAL ISSUES 106 (1991))); Bowen, supra note 63, at 155 ("The
inherent weaknesses of the Lemon test became apparent in the inconsistent results the
test produced in cases with relatively similar facts and issues." (footnote omitted)); Jesse
H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools-An Update, 75
CAL. L. REV. 5, 6 (1987) ("It is fair to say that [decisions subsequent to Lemon] have
produced a conceptual disaster area.").
214. "While this principle [the three-part test] is well settled, our cases have also
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that it could "only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation" in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 21 5 This elusiveness is apparent in
the Lemon 21
test's
effective evolution from a three-prong test to a two6
prong test.
Recently, the Court has split into two opposing factions concerning
Establishment Clause analysis. One side advocates reformulating the
Court's approach into a "coercion test, ' 217 while the other advocates
refining and focusing principally on the current endorsement
*28
inquiry.
The coercion test would ask whether the government has
"coerce[d] anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise.,,219 The endorsement test would ask whether a "reasonable
observer is likely to draw from the facts ... an inference
that the State
itself is endorsing a religious practice or belief."220

emphasized that it provides 'no more than [a] helpful signpos[t]' in dealing with
Establishment Clause challenges." Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394 (alteration in original)
(quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973)).
Eight of the Justices presently on the Court have expressed their dislike for the structure and the application of the Lemon test. Justice Scalia adamantly opposes the test,
calling it "some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave
and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried." Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct.
at 2149 (Scalia, J., concurring); see Linda P. Campbell, High Court OKs New Look at
Guidelines, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 30, 1993, §1, at 1.
While Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy favor a test
that would allow "governmental religious practices as long as nonbelievers did not feel
coerced," Justices O'Connor, Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter favor the endorsement test
first formulated in Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly. Linda
Greenhouse, God and Country; A School Case Goes to the Heart of a Great Issue, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 1993, § 4 (Late Edition), at 1. Justice Ginsburg's views are not yet
known. Id.
215. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
216. For a discussion of this evolution, see supra notes 111-15 and accompanying
text.
217. This group includes Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Kennedy. See supra note 214.
218. This group includes Justices O'Connor, Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter. See
supra note 214.
219. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
220. Witters, 474 U.S. at 493 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also supra notes 9395 and accompanying text. If it revises Lemon, the Court will not likely revert to the
Everson neutrality standard, for the Court has repeatedly emphasized that even though a
statute may neutrally distribute benefits, it still may violate the Establishment Clause.
See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609 (1988). Under Everson, almost any
provision of the IDEA that touched a sectarian school would be upheld as constitutional,
for the IDEA is a statute that "distributes benefits neutrally" to disabled children without
regard to religion. See Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2467; see also Guernsey & Sweeney, supra
note 6, at 269 (noting that if the neutrality approach were used today, fewer questions
would arise about the validity of state aid under the EHA).
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An advantage of both tests is that each would simplify the Court's
inquiry by restricting it to a specific issue. Still, each test is flawed:
The endorsement test may not always uphold historical practices
previously found constitutional by the Court. 22' The coercion test
does not consider the "subtle ways that government can show
favoritism to particular beliefs or convey a message of disapproval to
others. 222
The coercion test also possesses another, more serious fault. Even
its advocates must admit that it "would permit Congress to enact a law
declaring Christianity to be the official religion of the United Statesso long as the law did nothing to compel anyone to support this official
223
religion by attendance, or financial support, or some other means."
Since Everson,22 4 the Court has held that the First Amendment, at a
minimum, prohibits both the federal government and state governments from establishing a church. 5 This was one of the ultimate
dangers that the Framers attempted to eliminate as they drafted the
Establishment Clause.226 Thus, the coercion test cannot provide the
protection required by the Framers and the Court.
As the rise of these two tests and the setting aside of Lemon in
recent cases demonstrate, the Court is reluctant to evaluate government
action with a rigid three-prong test. This reluctance demonstrates the
need for a comprehensive new test. Such a test can be formulated by
condensing the three-prong test into a sole criterion that calls for close
scrutiny of the effects that a statute may have on the relationship
between government and religious groups. Specifically, for the
reasons discussed below, the effect prong of the Lemon test should be
refined, while the secular purpose and entanglement prongs should be
abandoned.
First, as mentioned above, the Court's application of the secular
purpose prong of the Lemon test has become an empty exercise.227
Second, the Court's application of the entanglement prong has led to
an "insoluble paradox. '' 22 8 The Court has indicated that state aid to
221. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 674 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
222. Id. at 627-28 (O'Connor, J.,concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
223. Edward B. Foley, Political Liberalism and Establishment Clause Jurisprudence,
43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 963, 968 (1993).
224. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
225. Id. at 15.
226. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting);
Everson, 330 U.S. at 12-13.
227. See supra notes !!1-15 and accompanying text.
228. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 109 (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting) (citing Roemer v.
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sectarian schools should be monitored to prevent its being used for
sectarian purposes.22 9 Yet at the same time, the Court has determined
that a state's close supervision of a sectarian school constitutes entanglement. 230 This dilemma renders the entanglement prong of limited
value.
The effect prong is the only part of the Lemon test that provokes
fruitful analysis of interactions between church and state. 23' The Court
can refine this prong to account for the dangers that the purpose and
entanglement prongs were created to protect against. Indeed, the
Court's recent treatment of the coercion and endorsement tests suggest
that it now recognizes the utility of the effect prong.232 Both the
coercion and endorsement tests ultimately turn on the effects caused by
a challenged program,233 although each recognizes a different
threshold of when a program violates the Establishment Clause.
Zobrest illustrates how, without relying on the Lemon, endorsement, or coercion tests, the Court can reach the right result on an
Establishment Clause issue. Despite the presence on the Court of
proponents of both the coercion and endorsement tests, in Zobrest the
Court did not expressly inquire into the presence of coercive pressure
or endorsement. Moreover, under either the coercion or endorsement

Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768-69 (1976) (White, J., concurring in the
judgment)). Justice White first identified the "insoluble paradox" raised by the entanglement prong in his concurring opinion in Lemon. 403 U.S. at 668 (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
In Wallace, Justice Rehnquist criticized the entanglement prong for its self-defeating
character. 472 U.S. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). After expressing his dislike for
Lemon, Justice Rehnquist advocated a historical test that affords more flexibility in
government involvement in religion as long as the government does not assert a preference for one religious group over another, See id. at 113.
229. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 109 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
230. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
23 1. See generally Paulsen, supra note 3, at 804 ("It is not the motivation or identity
of a law's supporters, but the effects of a law that properly determine its
constitutionality.").
232. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655-61 (1992) (declining to specifically apply the Lemon test, but focusing in substance on the effects of a religious
exercise at a public school graduation, i.e., public pressure and compulsion to
participate in the religious exercise); Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592-98 (applying Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lynch and focusing on her endorsement concept as it
applied to the effect prong of Lemon).
233. See Mitchell, supra note 44, at 874 (discussing how Justice O'Connor refined
the effect prong of the Lemon test with her endorsement concept); Paulsen, supra note 3,
at 823 (discussing the origin of the coercion test in Justice Kennedy's discussion of the
effect prong in his Allegheny opinion) (citing Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
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test, the Zobrest result would most likely be the same.234 Providing a
sign-language interpreter for a deaf child in a sectarian school cannot
be said to coerce anyone to adopt a certain religion.235 In addition,
because the IDEA would make interpreters equally available to all
students, it would not endorse sectarian schools.
In Zobrest, the Court identified the characteristics of the IDEA and
analyzed their effect on the relationship between the state and the
sectarian school. 6 In so doing, Zobrest essentially employed a test
that examines the religion-supporting effects of a program in light of
the individual interests advanced by the program. Zobrest, therefore,
exemplifies how a flexible balancing approach allows the Court to
abandon Lemon and its progeny to uphold a worthy program.
The Zobrest Court emphasized certain factors it now views as
weighing heavily on a program's propriety. The Court characterized
the following attributes of the IDEA as supporting constitutionality:
(1) the personal decision-making power afforded parents; 237 (2) the
lack of reimbursement of normal operating expenses to sectarian
schools; 238 (3) the purpose of meeting the educational needs of
disabled children; 239 and (4) the neutrality of distribution of IDEA
benefits. 240 The Court then balanced these characteristics against the
following effects the IDEA would have had in providing James
Zobrest a sign-language interpreter: (1) the placement of a
government-funded employee in a sectarian school; 24 1 (2) the interpreter's conveying secular as well as religious material; 242 and (3) an
incidental benefit accruing to a sectarian school.243 The complexity
and number of these factors were better accounted for by the balancing
test the Court effectively applied than they would have been had the
Court applied a rigid three-prong test.
Following the approach manifested in Zobrest will allow the Court
to effectively consider the changing interests of both the goverment 244
234. See Paulsen, supra note 3, at 861.
235. Id.
236. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2467-69.
237. Id. at 2469.
238. Id. at 2468.
239. Id. at 2469.
240. Id. at 2467.
241. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2467.
242. Id. at 2469.
243. Id. at 2468.
244. The IDEA exemplifies a modern interest in rights and protections for the
disabled. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (b)-(c) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (listing congressional
findings prior to the IDEA's enactment and stating the IDEA's purpose); supra notes 20,
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and individuals. Still, the Court should guard against allowing a
balancing test to grow so intricate that it obscures the historical
purpose of the Establishment Clause.2 45 The Court can avoid this
danger by grounding each balancing inquiry in the fundamental question of whether the government has effectively asserted a preference
for a given religion.246
Perhaps the Court has not expressly abandoned the Lemon test
because it cannot decide what test would be an appropriate replacement. 247 Furthermore, as Justice Scalia has suggested, the Lemon test
may be a convenience that the Court does not want to sacrifice: the
Court can apply the test when it yields a favored result, or ignore the
test when it impedes the Court's agenda.248 Indeed, Zobrest, Marsh,
and Lee suggest that in this way the Court has achieved its desired
results without expressly overruling Lemon or affirmatively replacing
it. Yet this arbitrary approach to Establishment Clause issues is not a
satisfactory basis for states to predict the constitutionality of their
programs or for lower courts to determine the constitutionality of those
programs.
V.

IMPACT

A. The Confusing Reign of Lemon Continues
As suggested by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Establishment Clause
193. Congress continuously faces new national interests and needs. The Court must
employ tests that provide sufficient flexibility to accommodate the interests reflected in
the legislation it examines. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-85 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
245. After examining the historical background of the clause, the Everson Court
concluded that at the very least, neither the federal government nor a state government
can establish a church. 330 U.S. at 8-15. See also Wallace, 472 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (stating that "[tihe true meaning of the Establishment Clause can only be
seen in its history" (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 671-73 (1970)));
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673-78).
246. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The Clause was...
designed to stop the Federal Government from asserting a preference for one religious
denomination or sect over others.").
247. See Dixie S. Huefner, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District: A Foothill
in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence?87 Educ. L. Rep. 15 (West) (Jan. 27, 1994).
Another reason that has been advanced for the Court's reluctance to replace the Lemon
test is the Court's reliance on "substantial precedent that supports the application of the
Lemon test to establishment clause controversies." Bowen, supra note 63, at 156
(footnote omitted).
248. Justice Scalia, a critic of the Lemon test, has frankly observed that "[wihen we
wish to strike down a practice [the test] forbids, we invoke it; when we wish to uphold a
practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely." Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2150 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted). See also Campbell, supra note 214, at
1.
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jurisprudence is a delicate area of constitutional law.249 Perhaps this is
so because Establishment Clause issues demand a fact-intensive analysis. 21 Based on the facts presented in Zobrest, the Court has carved
out another appropriate use of public funds in sectarian schools. A
novel feature of the use approved by Zobrest is the placement of a
governmental employee in a sectarian school. 2"' This aspect of
Zobrest may lay the groundwork for future attempts to place public
workers in sectarian institutions.
As it stands, Zobrest will foster uncertainty for lower courts called
upon to apply the Lemon test. Some courts may conclude that because
the Zobrest majority relied on cases that had relied on Lemon, the
Court did not overrule the three-prong test.252 2Other
courts may ignore
53
the Lemon test, as did the Zobrest Court itself.
Soon the Court's docket will present it with another opportunity to

249. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 393 (1983) (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612).
250. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2661.
251. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2469; see also id. at 2471 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for authorizing for the first time a public employee's direct
involvement in religious education).
252. See, e.g., Gonzales v. North Township of Lake County, 4 F.3d 1412 (7th Cir.
1993). In Gonzales, the Seventh Circuit held that the display of a crucifix in a public
park violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 1422-23. The court found that the crucifix violated the second prong of the Lemon test by conveying a primary message of the
township's endorsement of Christianity. Id.
Before applying the Lemon test, the Gonzales court assessed the test's precedential
value. Id. at 1417-18. The court noted that in Lamb's Chapel the Supreme Court
"reminded" courts that Lemon is controlling precedent for analyzing Establishment
Clause issues. Id. The court also noted that many times the Supreme Court avoids
employing the Lemon test and instead relies on cases with facts similar to the facts
before it. Gonzales, 4 F.3d at 1418 (citing Lee, 112 S.Ct. at 2655; Marsh v. Chambers,
463 U.S. 783 (1983)).
The Gonzales court concluded its examination of the recent treatment of Lemon with
the Zobrest case, stating that although the Zobrest Court did not mention the Lemon
test, the test had not been overruled. Id. at 1419. The court reasoned that because the
Zobrest majority relied on cases, such as Mueller and Witters, that relied on Lemon, the
Lemon test has not been abandoned. Id.
253. See, e.g., Warner v. Orange County Dep't of Probation, 827 F. Supp. 261, 26469 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). The Warner court denied a defendant's motion to dismiss a claim of
an Establishment Clause violation rooted in religious elements of Alcoholics
Anonymous meetings that the plaintiff was ordered to attend as part of his probation.
Id. at 267-69. Before analyzing the plaintiffs claim, the court addressed the Lemon test.
Id. at 266. The court expressed uncertainty over relying on the test, which it attributed
to the recent decisions in Lee and Zobrest. Id. According to the court, those two
decisions, "although neither directly overturning nor limiting the Lemon holding, seem
to indicate that the Court does not intend to rely so heavily upon it." Id. The court then
stated that it would analyze the facts of Warner without "undue reliance" on the Lemon
test and relied instead on Lee. Warner, 827 F. Supp. at 266-69.
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reexamine the Lemon test.25 4 After avoiding Lemon for the third time
in ten years,255 the Court cannot easily pass again on overhauling the
three-prong test. What Zobrest suggests is that the Court should opt
for injecting flexibility into its Establishment Clause framework by
adopting a balancing test that focuses on the effect of state aid to
sectarian institutions.256
B. FutureInterpretationsof the IDEA
In Zobrest, the Court appeared to endorse a broad reading of the
IDEA's reach and requirements. Specifically, Zobrest upheld a school
district's assisting a child enrolled in a sectarian school under the
IDEA, even though the child could have attended a public school.25 7
The Zobrest Court also approved the placement of a public employee
in a sectarian school to assist in communicating religious instruction to
a student. 8 After Zobrest, the Court provided another broad reading
of the IDEA in Florence County School DistrictFour v. Carter.259 In
Florence County, the Court unanimously held that the IDEA does not
bar reimbursing parents for private school tuition where the state has
failed to provide appropriate public school education for their child and
has failed to place their child in a state-approved private school. 2 ° The
Court also held that parents are not barred from reimbursement merely
because they choose to send their child to a private school that is not
state-approved. 26' Together, Zobrest and Florence County suggest
254. The Court has accepted Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v.
Grumet for argument in 1994. 618 N.E.2d 94 (N.Y. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S.Ct. 544
(1993). The issue in Grumet is whether a New York statute that created a separate public
school district to educate the disabled children of a Hasidic religious village violates the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 96. The Court of Appeals of New York held that the statute
violated the second prong of the Lemon test by "convey[ing] a message of
governmental endorsement of religion." Id. at 101. The court reasoned that such a
message is conveyed because the statute accommodates the Hasidic community's desire
to insulate its students. Id. The court noted that the statute created an entirely new
school district, rather than merely providing special services to disabled children at a
neutral site. Id.
255. Lee, Marsh, and Zobrest demonstrate the Court's avoidance of the Lemon test in
recent years. See supra notes 116-28 and accompanying text.
256. See supra part IV.C.
257. The Zobrests did not enroll their son in a sectarian school because the public
school could not provide their child with his IEP; the Zobrests decided to enroll him in a
Catholic school for religious reasons. Zobrest, 113 S.Ct. at 2464.
258. Id. at 2471 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
259. 114 S. Ct. 361 (1993).
260. Id. at 365-66.
261. Id. at 366. The Court noted, however, that total reimbursement would not be
provided if the cost of the private schooling was unreasonable. Id.
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that the Court will resolve conflicts under the IDEA in favor of
disabled children wherever possible.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Zobrest illustrates two prominent
trends. First, it demonstrates the Court's tendency to broadly interpret
the IDEA. Second, Zobrest adds to the uncertainty over the vitality of
the three-prong Lemon test. While the Zobrest decision may represent
a victory for disabled children seeking education in a sectarian school,
the Court has only heightened the need to revise the Lemon test in
order to accommodate today's Establishment Clause controversies.
MICHAELLE GRECO CACCHILLO

